NEW DELHI – September 5, 2026 (STL.News) Iran’s decades-old strategy of projecting power across the Middle East through Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and armed groups in Iraq is undergoing one of its most significant transformations, raising questions about how much control Tehran still exercises over organizations traditionally described as its proxies.
The development does not mean Iran’s regional allies have collectively turned against the Islamic Republic. Nor is there sufficient evidence to conclude that the Iranian government is on the verge of collapse.
What is increasingly apparent, however, is that the network Tehran spent decades building has become more decentralized, locally focused and operationally independent.
A recent analysis from Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center describes Iran’s proxy model as undergoing “structural degradation.” Iran originally developed the network to project influence throughout Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza while reducing the risks associated with direct confrontation between Iran and its adversaries.
The result today may be very different from the system Iran originally created.
Instead of Tehran simply issuing orders that regional armed groups execute, Iran increasingly faces a collection of organizations with their own weapons, political interests, financing networks, territorial ambitions and military capabilities.
That distinction could fundamentally change the Middle East.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance Is Under Pressure
Iran has spent decades developing what became known as the “Axis of Resistance,” an informal network of governments and armed organizations sharing varying degrees of hostility toward Israel and the United States.
The network historically included Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, numerous Iraqi armed factions and the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
But the strategic environment surrounding Iran has changed dramatically.
A recent UK House of Commons Library assessment concluded that the military capabilities of several Iran-backed organizations have been substantially degraded during conflicts since 2023. It also noted increasing pressure for Hamas, Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces to disarm.
Iran has also suffered setbacks in its ability to project conventional military power.
The question is no longer simply whether Iran’s regional network has become weaker.
It is whether Tehran can continue coordinating it.
Houthis Demonstrate Growing Independence
Yemen’s Houthis provide perhaps the clearest example of how Iran’s regional strategy has evolved.
Iran provided assistance that helped the Houthis develop missile and drone capabilities. But years of warfare have pushed the organization toward greater technological and operational independence.
Experts interviewed by Deutsche Welle recently described the Houthis as possessing significantly greater operational autonomy than they did approximately a decade ago. Iran and Hezbollah helped establish the foundations of the organization’s missile and drone programs, but the Houthis subsequently developed domestic manufacturing capabilities and broader regional networks.
That development creates a strategic paradox for Tehran.
Iran helped create an organization capable of threatening adversaries without requiring direct Iranian military intervention.
But the more capable that organization becomes independently, the less dependent it is on Tehran.
Recent events provide another important indication.
The House of Commons Library reported that the Houthis renewed attacks against Saudi Arabia during 2026. However, analysts cited by the parliamentary research service assessed those operations as being framed around specifically Yemeni and Saudi grievances rather than simply supporting Iran.
That does not make the Houthis anti-Iranian.
It makes them increasingly capable of pursuing their own agenda.
Iraqi Militias Face a Different Choice
Iraq may present an even more complicated challenge for Tehran.
Iran maintains longstanding relationships with several armed organizations operating within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces.
But those organizations operate within an Iraqi political system, meaning their interests do not always align perfectly with Iran’s.
Iraq’s government is attempting to disarm or integrate PMF factions into state security forces. According to the House of Commons Library, the Iraqi government established an end-of-September 2026 objective for that process, although several PMF factions oppose the proposal.
That creates competing pressures.
Militia leaders must consider their relationships with Tehran while simultaneously protecting their political influence, military power and economic interests inside Iraq.
Some may therefore resist decisions that could expose them to devastating retaliation, even if they advance Iranian strategic objectives.
Analysis earlier this year similarly raised questions about Tehran’s ability to control Iraqi militias, particularly as those organizations weigh their own survival and political interests.
Iran still possesses substantial influence.
But influence and direct command are not the same thing.
Hezbollah Remains Closely Connected to Tehran
Hezbollah represents a different situation.
For decades, the Lebanese organization was arguably Iran’s most important regional partner. Tehran provided weapons, financing, training, and political support while Hezbollah developed one of the Middle East’s most formidable non-state military forces.
Hezbollah remains closely connected to Iran.
Reports that Iran’s entire proxy network has suddenly abandoned Tehran would therefore be misleading.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah has been significantly weakened.
Lebanon’s government has increased pressure on the organization to disarm, prohibited Hezbollah’s military activities and expanded the Lebanese Armed Forces’ presence into territory previously dominated by Hezbollah, according to the House of Commons Library. Hezbollah has resisted disarmament.
Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah has also become more difficult because of changes elsewhere in the region.
The collapse of Iran’s former strategic position in Syria disrupted a critical geographical link connecting Iran to Lebanon.
Le Monde reported in August that the combination of Syria’s political transformation and Hezbollah’s weakening has substantially changed the balance inside Iran’s regional network.
For Tehran, that represents an enormous strategic setback.
Hamas Faces Its Own Survival Questions
Hamas presents another example of why the word “proxy” can oversimplify Iran’s regional relationships.
Iran supported Hamas despite important ideological differences. Their relationship developed around overlapping strategic interests, particularly opposition to Israel.
But Hamas has its own leadership, objectives, and political calculations.
Following years of warfare in Gaza, Hamas’ military position and Iran’s physical access to the organization have been substantially weakened.
Under the framework governing Gaza’s postwar transition, Hamas has faced international pressure to surrender its weapons and relinquish governing authority.
In August, Hamas agreed to a proposal that included phased weapons surrender, although major questions surrounding implementation remain unresolved.
Iran therefore faces another potential erosion of its regional influence.
But Hamas’ weakening does not automatically mean its relationship with Tehran has disappeared.
Decades of weapons knowledge, training and organizational relationships cannot necessarily be eliminated simply by disrupting supply lines.
Iran May Be Losing Control Without Losing Influence
This distinction is crucial.
Iran does not need absolute control over every armed organization to benefit from its regional network.
The Islamic Republic can continue providing training, intelligence, political assistance, technical knowledge and strategic coordination.
Iran can also benefit when these organizations attack common adversaries independently.
At the same time, however, independent decision-making creates risks for Tehran.
A militia could launch an attack Iran does not want.
A regional organization could refuse to participate when Tehran needs assistance.
Another could negotiate independently with a neighboring government.
Some could prioritize survival over ideological loyalty.
Others could eventually develop financing and weapons-production systems that make Iranian assistance less important.
Deutsche Welle’s examination of Iran’s drone network highlights precisely this transformation. The proliferation of drone technology has helped create multiple centers of expertise rather than one system entirely dependent on Iranian weapons deliveries.
Iran may consequently have helped construct a network that can survive even when Tehran itself is weakened.
The Proxy Network Is Reorganizing, Not Disappearing
Another reason to be cautious about predictions of Iran’s imminent regional collapse is that the Axis of Resistance has shown considerable adaptability.
The Axis of Resistance has demonstrated considerable adaptability.
Iran’s network appears to be reorganizing around Yemen and Iraq following setbacks in Syria and Lebanon.
Le Monde reported in August that Iraqi militias and the Houthis have become increasingly important components of Tehran’s regional strategy. The network therefore may be changing geographically rather than simply disappearing.
This means two developments can occur simultaneously.
Iran can lose control over its allies while those same organizations remain dangerous.
Indeed, greater independence could potentially make the network more unpredictable.
An organization operating under tight Iranian command might, in theory, be restrained when Tehran wants to avoid escalation.
An autonomous organization might not be.
Is the Islamic Republic Beginning to Collapse?
That remains a much larger question.
Iran is unquestionably facing severe pressure.
The country has endured military conflict, sanctions, economic strain, leadership disruption and challenges to its regional position.
The House of Commons Library reported in late August that divisions exist within Iran’s ruling establishment while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has assumed an increasingly important role.
Those are serious developments.
They are not proof that the Islamic Republic is about to collapse.
Political systems can survive prolonged economic hardship, military defeats and internal divisions, particularly when security institutions remain capable of suppressing domestic challenges.
The IRGC remains especially important.
The Council on Foreign Relations describes the Revolutionary Guard as one of Iran’s most powerful institutions and a central link between the Iranian government and armed organizations hostile to Israel and the United States.
As long as Iran’s security establishment remains cohesive and capable of exercising power domestically, predictions of immediate regime collapse should be treated cautiously.
Tehran Faces a Strategic Problem of Its Own Making
The more consequential development may be something subtler.
Iran created its regional network because it let Tehran project military power without directly fighting every conflict.
That strategy worked remarkably well for decades.
Iran could pressure Israel, threaten American forces, influence governments, and create deterrence far beyond its borders without deploying large conventional Iranian armies.
But the model depended heavily on Iran’s ability to coordinate the network.
That assumption is now being tested.
Iran’s partners possess more independent weapons capabilities. Some have their own manufacturing systems. Others control territory, participate in domestic politics or operate international smuggling and financing networks.
Their priorities increasingly reflect conditions in Beirut, Baghdad, Gaza and Sanaa as much as decisions made in Tehran.
Iran therefore may be transitioning from commanding an Axis of Resistance to influencing a much looser coalition of armed movements.
That could represent a major reduction in Iranian regional power.
But it could also produce something more unpredictable: a decentralized network of heavily armed organizations capable of operating even when Iran does not provide direct instructions.
For the United States, Israel, and governments throughout the Middle East, that distinction matters.
Tehran’s weakening does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the organizations Iran helped build.
Iran’s proxy system may be fracturing.
The Islamic Republic itself remains under extraordinary pressure.
But based on the evidence currently available, the more accurate conclusion is not that Iran’s proxy armies have collectively turned against Tehran or that the Iranian government has definitively entered its final days.
Instead, Iran appears to be confronting the unintended consequence of decades spent building powerful armed partners: Tehran may still influence them, but it can no longer assume that influence equals control.
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